Faced with an overflowing caseload and imperatives of national reconciliation, Rwandan authorities have established a system of traditional justice, meted out through gacaca courts under the legal framework created by organic laws. The following contribution analyses this framework, within the context of national and international legal systems, and pinpoints the shortcomings of the proposed form of justice. These include legal issues such as the problem of retroactivity, as well as the definition of crimes and concerns over due process and the right to a fair trial for defendants. Practical and material obstacles arise in implementing the organic laws, alongside broader implications owing to the traditional nature of such courts and possible interference by political authorities. In this respect, the gacaca courts may be victims of their own ambitions, by seeking to respond to judicial, societal and philosophical concerns alike.
The Context

A. Qualifying the Irrational
The Rwandan genocide is only just beginning to be addressed. As with all instances of 'radical evil', in the Kantian words often used to refer to crimes against humanity, 1 it inevitably defies rational discourse. The innocent victims, whose mere existence was their only crime, and the perpetrators' terrifying and ongoing disregard for them 2 prove beyond doubt that evil is irrational. As Primo Levi wrote with regard to Nazi extermination camps, 'what happened cannot be understood, and, even, should not be understood; to understand is 3 Explaining evil as such is unconscionable. Explaining a crime muffles its violence. Any lawyer knows that. One is reduced to a phenomenology of horroröa description of the unfathomable.
Such description is not solely the necessary application of the law, it is not exclusively geared towards constructing the historian's discourse, it is not merely the object of psychologists' and ethnologists' study. It inevitably raises ontological issues that the lawyer ignores as irrelevant to his own purposes, but they crop up incessantly. 4 The lawmaker and the judge, the legal theorist or practitionerömust they not necessarily take the irrational into account to fully grasp the facts? The commission of a genocide raises both issues with regard to the very meaning of the rule as well as its enforcement. 5 Lawyers are confronted with a specific description, using legal terms, of what occurred, to qualify the facts. Legal discourse itself falls short, and crimes such as 'genocide' and 'crimes against humanity' 6 had to be invented, to express the unthinkable and confer legal quality. That which could not be named had to be.
B. To Judge Regardless?
The sheer number of futile deaths was so high that even today, its numbers are uncertain to the nearest 100,000. Ten years later, mass graves continue to be uncovered on a daily basis. For the first time in the history of humanity, the perpetrators' belonging to a particular national or political group is not clearly identified, unlike the Romans vis-a' -vis the Carthaginians, the young Turkish government vis-a' -vis Armenians, or Nazis vis-a' -vis the Jews. Further, no other genocide has torn apart the social fabric to this extent, as those in power mobilized an unprecedented majority of the civilian population against a minority which often included neighbours, friends and relatives. They tortured and killed, upon the authorization, encouragement and reassurance of leaders, i.e. in Rwanda, by the legal system. Such was the challenge the new Rwandan government faced at the end of 1994. There is no greater dawn for human justice than punishing the crime of crimes, committed by tens of thousands of individuals who, for the most part, once again lived alongside their victims or the mass graves they had abandoned after their 'work' was done, in a country where the horror ceased only with the use of force and where the war had destroyed the judiciary's human and material resources.
State structures, including courts, had been annihilated. Prior to April 1994, the judicial system bore serious defects. In a report published at the end of 1992, a commission composed of magistrates and staff from the Ministry of Justice denounced the insufficient number of judges, lack of adequate training and material resources, and the dependence of the judiciary on the executive power. What remains to be said of the judicial system after the massacres? Prisons, dungeons, improvised detention centres (such as containers buried in the ground) are filled with hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thousands of detainees, some of whom are almost certainly guilty and others almost certainly innocent. According to the Interior Ministry, there were already about 60,000 detainees in 1995, 90 per cent of them male.
7 Trials had to be conducted.
The establishment of a sort of 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission', based on the South African experiment, was rejected as allowing impunity, which was blamed in the first place for the events leading up to the paroxysm in 1994. The will to bring all perpetrators before a judge 'departed from the practice of previous governments. Concerning other massacres, which bore resemblance to the repetition of an announced genocide, political authorities had refused to prosecute identified perpetrators or had rushed to grant them amnesty, thus perpetuating impunity'. 
Rwandan Laws Concerning Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
Rwandan law was wholly unequipped for the situation. As in many other countries, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, ratified by Rwanda in 1975, 9 had not been implemented in domestic law and no specific sentence was established for the repression of genocide or crimes against humanity.
10 Organic law no. 08/96 of 30 August 1996, on the organization of prosecution for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990, was promulgated in this context. 11 The new leaders having often lived in Uganda or Anglo-Saxon countries, this law was strongly influenced by principles of common law (such as plea-bargaining, guilty pleas and the comparatively lesser importance of written evidence), which neither the population nor the handful of remaining professional judges and lawyers were accustomed to. For obvious historical reasons, written law in Rwanda was largely drawn on the Roman^Germanic tradition. The civil law^common law divide therefore grafted itself onto the existing dualism between custom and written law.
The main weakness of the new law proved to be the slow pace of its implementation. Despite practices envisioned for the 'specialized chambers' established by the law, such as 'itinerant' hearings and 'group trials', and while prisons continued to brim over, 346 accused were tried in 1997, 928 in 1998, 1,318 in 1999, 2,458 in 2000, 1,416 in 2001 and 727 in 2002, or a total of 7,181 in six years. The task was daunting: at this rate, trying all the detainees would take decades, without counting those who might be implicated in the trials to come. This is still very much part of the debate: if the number of victims is indeed 1,000,000, how many perpetrators, co-perpetrators and 9 Decree-Law no. 08/75 of 12 February 1975, approving and ratifying various international treaties on human rights, disarmament, prevention and repression of certain acts likely to endanger peace among human beings and nations. 10 Article 5 provides: 'The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. ' In 2003, Rwanda adopted specific legislation: Law no. 33bis/2003 of 9 September 2003, repressing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 11 For an analysis of this law and its implementation (which is beyond the scope of this piece), see Digneffe and Fierens, supra note 8, at 64^73. Concerning the temporal application of the law, which will be identical for crimes before gacaca courts, in 1996, certain lawmakers proposed that the law punish genocide in general, without regard to limitations, while others argued that since the genocide began before 1990 and continued after 1994, the law should refer to genocide committed from 1959, i.e. the year of the first interethnic massacres. According to government representatives, 1 October 1990 was the date from which many people, particularly Tutsis, were killed. As for 31 December 1994, it was agreed that the genocide had ceased in July 1994, but that massacres were still perpetrated in various parts of the country; 31 December 1994 marked the end of all massacres. The idea of establishing gacaca courts crystallized in 1998, to address the practical challenge of prosecuting so many people in a traumatized country, devastated by the civil war and then the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a state where the social fabric is ravaged, where the authorities have many reasons to view the support of the international community with a sceptical eye.
However, expectations regarding such courts also evolved over the years. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the authorities and the survivors wished to have those who had committed the atrocities punished. The drive for such punishment, maybe even vengeance, spurred the public execution, on 24 April 1998, of the 22 first accused who had been convicted and received the death sentence. The authorities realized, however, that the unprecedented situation in Rwanda meant they could not wait for all perpetrators to be convicted. Keeping the vast majority of them in prison without a trial proved to be simply unthinkable. From a highly prosaic point of view, tending to the detainees came at great expense to the state. 13 Victims suffered great setbacks regarding reparations, as was the case with previous genocides. Perpetrators were insolvent and though the specialized chambers frequently condemned the state, this had but symbolic value, since none of those decisions was enforced.
14 In a country where perpetrators would necessarily be again living alongside their own victims, the rehabilitation of criminals became a pressing objective and warranted some form of reconciliation. The idea of resorting to 'participative' justice, supposedly inspired by traditional justice 'rendered on the lawn', 15 had been voiced during the colloquium held in Kigali from 31 October to 3 November 1995, on 'The Struggle Against Impunity: A Dialogue for National Reconciliation'. At the time, it was deemed to be inopportune and, thus, rejected. However, from May 1998 to May 1999, a series of meetings were held by the President of the Republic with the main administrative and political authorities, at the 'Urugwiro Village'. Tribunals drawing on Rwandan culture and adapting to the specific issues raised by the genocide were thus instituted.
Within a 'workshop'organized for members of parliament in May and June of 1996, the incumbent Minister of Justice presented the main reasons justifying the creation of gacaca courts. They can be summarized as follows: (i) establishing the truth on the number and identity of the victims as well as their lost possessions; (ii) punishing all those who bear a part of responsibility for the events of 1994; (iii) speeding up trials and simplifying judicial procedures; (iv) encouraging the population to participate in the administration of justice; (v) facilitating the gathering of evidence and decreasing travel for witnesses; (vi) reconciling Rwandans on the basis of such truth and the punishment of perpetrators. Initially, it envisioned four levels of courts: 19 one gacaca court for the cell, a gacaca court for the sector, and one for appeals at the level of each remaining sector.
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It must be pointed out that gacaca courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over individuals accused of the most serious crimes; those covered by 'category 1' in Article 51 of the current law 21 fall under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
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Therein lies a first paradox. If gacaca courts provide adequate guarantees and if they can attain the social goal ascribed to them, why not include first-category crimes in their jurisdiction? One argument is that the individuals in question are, by the serious nature of their acts, 'irretrievable' to an extent, and that reconciliation and rehabilitation prove to be irrelevant in such cases. But it seems that lawmakers opting for such exclusion only fuelled doubts as to the integrity of the new judicial system. Gacaca courts cannot impose the death penalty. 23 Does this indicate that they did not wish to remove the threat of that punishment for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes?
Lastly, it should be recalled that the Military Tribunal and the Military High Court exercise jurisdiction over members of the military. 24 Since 1994, these courts' activities, which include trials for acts committed during the genocide, have garnered surprisingly little interest from politicians, the international community, non-governmental organizations and lawyers in general. 
The New Constitutional Framework
To better address the issues raised by the 'gacaca laws', it is necessary to recall that Rwanda adopted a new Constitution on 4 creation of the people's courts. The Constitution draws on the main human rights treaties and institutions of Western democracies. It also states that it harbours the same goals as gacaca courts, while redesigning their legal framework. The Preamble aims to eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions; promote national unity and reconciliation; and build a state governed by the rule of law, based on respect for fundamental human rights, pluralistic democracy, equitable power sharing, tolerance and resolution of issues through dialogue. It reaffirms the privilege of having one country, a common language, a common culture and a long-shared history, which ought to lead to a common vision of their destiny; considers it necessary to extract positive values from their centuries-old history, which characterized their ancestors and that must found the existence and development of the Nation; upholds human rights 27 and equal rights between Rwandans, and between men and women. Article 9 of the Chapter on Fundamental Principles provides that the State of Rwanda commits itself to promoting the following principles: (i) fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; (ii) eradicating ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity; (iii) equitable sharing of power; (iv) building a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least 30 per cent of posts in decision-making organs; (v) building a state committed to promoting social welfare and establishing appropriate mechanisms for ensuring social justice; (vi) promoting the constant quest for solutions through dialogue and consensus.
The Constitution also enshrines the existence of gacaca courts, referred to as 'specialized courts', and prohibits the creation of special courts. 28 In addition, it provides for the adoption of a future law establishing a National Service which enjoys administrative and financial autonomy, charged with the follow-up, supervision and coordination of the activities of gacaca courts. Such law would determine its duties, organization and functioning. 29 Individual freedom is guaranteed by the state. No one shall be subjected to prosecution, arrest, detention or punishment on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a crime under the applicable law at the time it was committed. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of charges, and the right to defence are absolute at all levels and degrees of proceedings before administrative, judicial and all other decision-making bodies. 30 Every person accused of a crime shall be presumed innocent until his or her guilt has been conclusively proven in accordance with the law, in a fair and public hearing during which all necessary guarantees for the defence have been respected. Nobody shall be denied the right to appear before a judge, competent in law, to hear his or her case. 31 Nobody shall be punished for acts or omissions that did not constitute an offence under national or international law at the time of commission or omission. Neither shall any person be punished with a penalty which is heavier than the one that was applicable under the law at the time when the offence was committed. 32 No person shall be subjected to security measures except as provided for by law, for reasons of public order and state security. 33 The state shall ensure that the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power is vested in people who possess the competence and integrity required to fulfil the respective responsibilities accorded to the three branches. 34 The judiciary is independent and separate from the legislative and executive branches of government. It enjoys financial and administrative autonomy. Justice is rendered in the name of the people and nobody may be a judge in his or her own cause. Judicial decisions are binding on all parties concerned, be they public authorities or individuals. They shall not be challenged except through ways and procedures determined by law. 35 Court proceedings are conducted in public unless a court determines that the proceedings should be in camera on the ground that a public hearing might have an adverse effect on general public order or would outrage public morals. Every court decision shall indicate the grounds on which it is based, be written in its entirety and shall be delivered in open court. Courts apply orders and regulations only where they are not inconsistent with the Constitution and other laws. 36 Furthermore, Article 13 of the Constitution states that the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not have a period of limitation, and that revisionism, negationism and trivialization of genocide are punishable by law. 37 Article 14 indicates that the state shall, within the limits of its capacity, adopt special measures for the welfare of the survivors of genocide who were rendered destitute by the genocide committed in Rwanda from 1 October 1990 to 31 December 1994, the disabled, the indigent and the elderly, as well as other vulnerable groups. 
Questions and Misgivings
The limited scope of this contribution bars consideration of all the legal, factual and political issues raised by the creation of gacaca courts, even if we only refer to the most recent law. The following problems underscore the extent of the obstacles Rwandan officials continue to face over a decade after the genocide. They also lead to believe that trying tens of thousands of alleged perpetrators of this massacre, while establishing a classical constitutional order or respecting international standards of fair trial, while reverting back to Rwandan traditions, proves to be no easy endeavour. The aim is not to take stock, but rather raise a number of questions, at a time when gacaca courts are delivering their very first judgments.
38
A. Legal Issues
The following analysis discusses a number of legal issues, selected because they directly bear on the will to address a post-genocidal situation by creating original judicial institutions.
'Special' Courts?
In principle, special courts cannot be created for the purpose of stripping ordinary courts of jurisdiction over certain crimes. Article 143 of the Rwandan Constitution explicitly states so, by forbidding the creation of 'special courts'. This is a highly ambiguous term, since 'special courts' could also refer to courts specialized in certain proceedings, such as military tribunals or juvenile courts, and their institution is not currently in question. It seems preferable to use the terms 'extraordinary courts' for courts whose creation is prohibited by classical democratic constitutions.
Gacaca courts fall squarely within the latter category: they were established to adjudicate acts committed in a time of political crisis, they are temporary by essence and they are composed of judges who were not appointed prior to the facts at hand. 
The Problem of Retroactivity
Rwandan lawmakers had to explain why acts committed between 1990 and 1994 could be punished by a law adopted after 1996. By ratifying the Convention for the prevention of genocide, Rwanda had in effect prohibited that crime 41 but, as has been previously said, it did not provide for a specific penalty. And the case was even more complicated for crimes against humanity.
42 Indeed, the treaty only contains the duty for States Parties, in accordance with their own constitutions, to adopt the necessary legislative measures, but it does not provide as such for integration in national systems itself. The Preamble of the law on gacaca courts states that the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity are provided for by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to protecting civil persons in wartime and the Additional Protocols, but neither do these treaties address the crimes as such, nor do they impose the establishment of penalties in national law.
To avoid allegations of retroactivity, and particularly a violation of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, Organic Law no. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 required the acts committed to be doubly prohibited, both by the Rwandan penal code 
and the organic law, itself referring to international law. 43 The reasoning stood as follows: the 1977 Rwandan Penal Code incriminated acts equivalent to genocide or crimes against humanity, but under different appellations. Thus, it was put forward that punishing such acts with the sentences provided for in the code would suffice to counter retroactivity.
The argument's weakness is immediately apparent. Applying penalties from the Penal Code to acts prohibited elsewhere than in the Code bears more resemblance to legalistic block-building than respect for the principle of non-retroactivity. A genocide or crime against humanity does not contain the same acts as those laid out in the Penal Code. The overarching social necessity of going beyond the traditional incriminations of murder, assault and battery or rape is one such clue of this. The point, as it was in 1945, is to adopt different prohibitions precisely because what happened went beyond the penal code. Furthermore, the international prohibition, which purports to express the exceptional gravity, even supreme gravity, of certain crimes, calls on judges to inflict particularly severe penalties, and thus engenders retroactive effects.
Organic Law no. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001, establishing the creation of gacaca courts, also contained a double prohibition, phrased in rather awkward terms inherited from the Organic Law of 1996. 44 Article 1 stated that 'the purpose of this organic law is to organize the putting in trial of persons prosecuted for having, between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, committed acts qualified and punished by the penal code and which constitute: a) either crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity as defined by the Convention of The current law is therefore retroactive, more clearly so than the previous ones, and notwithstanding the fact that Article 18 of the Constitution states the principle under which individuals can only be punished for acts which constituted a crime at the time of their commission.
Accordingly, arguing that the principle of nulla poena sine lege has been or is respected might give way to affirming that the gravity of certain crimes simply outweighs such principle, as the Nuremberg judges implied. 
A Material Scope Theoretically Broader than the Genocide of Tutsis
Under Article 1 of aforementioned Law no. 16/2004, gacaca courts exercise jurisdiction exclusively over acts constituting genocide and other crimes against humanity, or acts perpetrated with the intention of committing genocide or other crimes against humanity. 46 This wording indicates that such courts could exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, regardless of genocidal intent, if they constitute other crimes against humanity, and over acts of genocide committed against a group other than Tutsis in the established timeframe.
Rumours show that proceedings before gacaca courts will involve the RPA forces that tried to recapture the territory in 1994. The political interpretation of subsequent laws rules out such jurisdiction for gacaca courts, as leaders 45 'It is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished' First Category: [47] (a) The person whose criminal acts or criminal participation place among planners, organizers, imitators, supervisors and ringleaders of the genocide or crimes against humanity, together with his or her accomplices; (b) The person who, at the time, was in the organs of leadership, at the national level, at the level of the Prefecture, Sub-Prefecture, Commune, in political parties, army, gendarmerie, communal police, religious denominations or in militia, has committed these offences or encouraged other people to commit them, together with his or her accomplices; (c) The well known murderer who distinguished himself or herself in the location where he or she lived or wherever he or she passed, because of the zeal which characterized him or her in killings or excessive wickedness 48 with which they were carried out, together with his or her accomplices; (d) The person who committed acts of torture against others, even though they did not result into death, together with is or her accomplices; (e) The person who committed acts of rape or acts of torture against sexual organs, together with his or her accomplices; (f) The person who committed dehumanizing acts on the dead body, together with his or her accomplices.
The Prosecutor General of the Republic publishes, at least twice a year, a list of persons classified in the first category, forwarded by Gacaca Courts of the Cell.
47 The first was defined as follows under Organic Law no. 08/96, which had introduced these categories: a) persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity; b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes; c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed; d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture. The post-war American tribunals had already used categories for trying Japanese criminals. (1) The person whose criminal acts or criminal participation place among killers or who committed acts of serious attacks against others, causing death, together with his or her accomplices; (2) The person who injured or committed other acts of serious attacks with the intention to kill them, but who did not attain his or her objective, together with his or her accomplices; (3) The person who committed or aided to commit other offences (against) persons, without the intention to kill them, together with his or her accomplices.
Third Category:
The person who only committed offences against property. However, if the author of the offence and the victim have agreed on their own, or before the public authority or witnesses for an amicable settlement, he or she cannot be prosecuted.
An analysis of the different variations in the Organic Law with regard to such categories since 1996 is beyond the scope of this contribution. It is worth noting that under Article 1 of Organic Law no. 16/2004, the gacaca courts exercise jurisdiction ratione materiae over crimes carried out 'with the intention of committing genocide or crimes against humanity'. Such intent may very well be present for acts falling within categories 1 through 2, and 2
. But, as regards the alleged perpetrators of criminal acts or criminal participation with intent of causing death (categories 2, 3 ), and those accused of offences against property (category 3), the article requires a finding of the intent to commit genocide or crimes against humanity in each instance. Under the principle of strict construction of criminal law, the current law would subtract a large number of individuals concerned by the latter categories from the jurisdiction of gacaca courts. Article 1 of Organic Law no. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 mentions crimes 'in connection with the events surrounding the genocide and crimes against humanity', which bears rather more resemblance to the current intention of lawmakers. This wording could have been preserved.
Fair Trials and the Rights of the Defence
The most obvious shortcoming of the gacaca laws lies in their lack of respect for rights of the defence. The nature and functioning of gacaca courts are not compatible with minimum standards of fair trials, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Articles 9 and 14) or the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Articles 6, 7 and 26), which Rwanda has ratified. The UN High Commission for Refugees, 49 the UN High Commission for Human Rights, 50 and even Human Rights
OUP Watch 51 already expressed their concern over this issue in 1999. The Council of the European Union had 'encouraged the Rwandan government to establish the gacaca system while ensuring respect for international human rights standards'. 52 Gacaca courts hold broad competences, 'similar to those of ordinary courts', exercising attributes of investigation, prosecution and judgment. 53 At the trial phase, they can issue subpoenas, proceed with search and seizure, adopt temporary measures, issue arrest warrants and order provisional detention or liberation. At the judgment and sentencing phases, gacaca courts acquit or convict individuals, pronounce sentences and allow compensation for victims. Does the right to a fair trial not preclude functional overlap between investigative or prosecutorial powers and trial powers?
Beyond the objective impartiality of gacaca courts, what of their subjective impartiality, i.e. that which appears in the eyes of the accused? 54 Quid of the principle, also enshrined in the legal decree providing for the organization of the judiciary, according to which a judge cannot make findings based on evidence obtained in a personal capacity? 55 The Cell's seat 56 collects files sent by the prosecution, takes note of offers to supply evidence or testimony, proceeds with investigations and adjudicates offences committed by perpetrators falling within the fourth category. Will the accused be allowed to consult his case file before the hearing? If so, who will help him or her read it, if he or she cannot do so him or herself? The law remains silent on this point.
Articles 64 and under of Organic Law no. 16/2004 establish detailed procedures for hearings. It is worth noting, among other aspects, that 'any interested
person' 57 may testify, in addition to the members of the General Assembly. The right to remain silent for the accused is not recognized, as he/she must respond to the questions put to him/her, thus triggering a violation of his/her right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 14 of the ICCPR.
While accused individuals may present their own defence, they cannot be assisted by counsel or other persons. The fact that interested persons may participate and testify in hearings could somewhat mitigate this serious breach of international standards, but, as such, the right to counsel and, generally, defence rights are not provided for. The right to be defended by an individual wholly distinct from the prosecution, witnesses or judges is nevertheless one of the most universally recognized human rights. Victims cannot be assisted either.
The law does not provide for representation, even for individuals who may have been minors at the time of the acts or victims suffering from serious trauma. One can only imagine how difficult it would be for victims of sexual crimes to have to come and testify in person.
The Rwandan authorities believe or pretend to believe that people's justice is infallible. It is immediately apparent that Rwandans have no more reason to tell the truth than anyone else in a given judicial system; that certain judges in those hills are themselves implicated in the genocide; that potential witnesses have been threatened directly and indirectly; and that, at times, the genocide's effectiveness was such that perpetrators, co-perpetrators and accomplices could simply establish gacaca courts among themselves.
The Rwandan authorities have adopted contradictory responses to these issues, either by asserting the gacaca courts' conformity with obligations under international law, or by stating that such conformity is irrelevant given the particular context. If the latter is true, Rwanda should have at least notified its intent to override provisions of the ICCPR under Article 4.
B. Issues Concerning the Facts
Exhorting supposedly traditional modes of conflict resolution in Rwanda provides no guarantees, and the nature of 'persons of integrity' to be elected as judges remains an issue. Further, the executive, rather than gacaca courts, adopts decisions concerning alleged perpetrators. Lastly, the length of proceedings does not bode well for their outcome, even after the process was considerably broadened on 10 March 2005.
The Reference to Tradition
The gacaca process supposedly harkens back to Rwandan tradition. It would be more accurate to state that it endeavours to legitimize a hereto unheard-of attempt at people's justice, which aims to deal as rapidly as is feasible with an avalanche of cases, rather than to draw upon cultural specificities. Charles Ntampaka, one of the leading experts on Rwandan customary law, observed that the traditional system of conflict resolution did not include any written rules; remained wary of legal prescriptions that adjudicate and convict; was closely related to the family unit; favoured the role of 'head of the family'; involved forms of collective responsibility; did not promote equality; gave priority to community interests over individual rights; often deemed confessions to be a form of provocation; and drew on the sacred and the religious. 58 Such characteristics are in stark contrast to the present gacaca courts and their functioning. The only resemblance lies in the fact that the institutional framework for conflict resolution involves local and non-professional judges, and, even then, they are elected in the reinvented gacaca system, whereas traditional judges were appointed by consensus between the concerned parties. The present gacaca court arises from a complex written law; is not traditional; rests on a supposedly legal basis; confers no privileges on family members; 59 allegedly respects individual rights; favours confessions; and does not include any references to religion. 60 
The Status of 'Persons of Integrity' (Inyangamugayo)
Implementing the planned legal framework gives rise to complex problems. Aforementioned issues of qualification present such obstacles, along with categorization and, generally, the complex nature of a long-winded and experimental law which nevertheless relates to judges who are often illiterate and lacking legal education. 61 The authorities provide for minimal training of 'persons of integrity', but one can doubt whether it enables effective implementation of a new and complicated law, which could provoke heated, even violent, debate. As judges receive no payment, the quorum prescribed by law is met with increasing difficulty in the experimental phase of implementation, due to rising poverty, and it has thus been reduced. 62 The risk of corruption is also rife.
'Solidarity Camps' and Liberation by the Executive
Under orders of the President, Rwandan police and authorities began transferring detainees to 'solidarity camps' (ingando) at the beginning of 2004. Prisoners are to follow 'reeducation courses' in these camps for a number of weeks, before reintegrating into their communities. 63 At the same time, about 20,000 individuals, of whom most had confessed, were temporarily set free, along with 2,000 ill or aged detainees. Three per cent were then re-incarcerated following new testimonies related to their crimes. The freed individuals have not been granted amnesty, as they are to be tried at a later date.
Two problems arise, other than the nature and precise function of solidarity camps. First, on what legal basis can the executive order these liberations, given that such power belongs to gacaca courts of the cell? 64 And, secondly, will these individuals actually be tried, or is this the first step towards a de facto amnesty? The first 'pilot' gacaca courts, set up in 2003, were finally entering into judgment phase at time of writing. Thirty-four decisions have just been handed down, 67 ranging from acquittals to sentences of up to 30 years in prison. At the same time, trials are officially under way in 751 other gacaca courts; 8,262 should be operational next year. Problems have accrued due to this very implementation, and the number of individuals implicated in testimonies delivered through these proceedings could come to over 1,000,000. The authorities place the gacaca process's completion at three to five years, but this time-line does not seem realistic. Furthermore, the authorities could fall into political strife, as 668 incumbent administrative or military leaders, including the prefect for the region of Ruhengeria and two of the most famous former officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF), have allegedly been accused before gacaca courts; 126 among them have been relieved of their duties, pending trial.
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Trials before ordinary courts for alleged perpetrators falling with the first category do seem to be taking place.
Conclusion: An Overly Ambitious Gacaca Law?
The main weakness of the gacaca laws lies perhaps in their very ambition. They strive to accomplish much more than the criminal conviction of perpetrators, by aiming to shed light on the truth of what happened, to recreate the social fabric and promote reconciliation. According to the Preamble of Organic Law no. 16/2004, which departs little from previous laws, the gacaca process aims to:
. . . achieve justice and reconciliation in Rwanda, and thus to adopt provisions enabling rapid prosecutions and trials of perpetrators and accomplices of genocide, not only with the aim of providing punishment, but also reconstituting the Rwandan Society that had been destroyed by bad leaders who incited the population into exterminating part of the Society; . . . it is important to provide for penalties allowing convicted prisoners to amend themselves and to favour their reintegration into the Rwandan Society without jeopardizing the people's normal life. It is not easy to discern how Rwandan tradition, or supposed reference to custom, might provide an outcome related to criminal law, which, at any rate, it cannot attain by itself. On the contrary, traditional gacaca is geared towards conciliationönot reconciliationörather than judgment.
69 Therein lies the difference between the old and new gacaca: tradition is cloaked in the mantle of a criminal trial, with a strict and written procedure, and leading to a supposedly legal judgment.
B. Between Vengeance and Pardon
The justice of man always lies between two extremes: vengeance and pardon.
A Just Distance
With vengeance, victims themselves inflict what they have suffered upon the perpetrator. Recollection of the crime is embedded in a violence that breeds another, in the exact reversal of a power paradigm. It is characterized by the absence of a just distance: 70 no rule of law, no moral interposes itself between the perpetrator and the victim, no third party, no tribunal divides the adversaries. Society may also wish to exact revenge. In this respect, public opinion, international included, presents a danger, as it constitutes the main vector for collective vengeance. Nietzsche, who was by no means sentimental, wrote that 'liberating man from thoughts of vengeance is the bridge for higher hopes, and the rainbow after long storms'. 71 Criminal law provides for a punishment which delineates a space between victims and perpetrators, between society and the perpetrator, by the intervention of a third partyöthe judge. Punishment is socialized, meted out in the name of society, not the victim. Society responds to the commission of an offence, to the injury wrought by a perpetrator, by inflicting a form of suffering: imprisonment, fines, even the death penalty. The emotional side of vengeance gives way to a rational side: moral retribution, re-establishing order, perhaps educating the perpetrator, perhaps preventing recurrence, perhaps showing an example, perhaps protecting society. Such are the different goals of punishment in criminal law and criminology. The strength of criminal punishment stems from the fact the Furthermore, repression remains unacceptable for perpetrators and their families. The different protagonists continue to ignore each other, even hate each other. The weakness of the gacaca process might lie in the fact that it still borders closely on vengeance, or at least revenge, to the point of forgetting the depth of victims' suffering, not only in the crime committed against them, but also in the void around them created by violence, and their absolute solitude. Such solitude is psychological, social and metaphysical, since the sublime has forsaken them forever. Criminal judgments present the advantage, if it can be so named, of cleaving a legal, social and symbolic distance between victims and perpetrators, and clearly stating that both good and evil exist.
A Purely Legal Truth
Can the gacaca system provide restorative justice, recreate the link between victims and perpetrators within the rule of law, beyond punishment? Political authorities consistently uphold, no doubt correctly, the need to link truth to justice. In this respect, to judge is also to name: a perpetrator, a victim, a past, a future. Justice and truth share intimate bonds, 73 but such justice and truth can only be judicial and criminal. They will only transcribe the horror and the suffering, inflict sentences of improbable virtue, and attempt to acknowledge victims. It cannot be infallible. The truth uncovered by gacaca courts will probably only serve to end discussions over what happened, through adjudication. Historians, particularly, should endeavour endlessly to better reveal such truth. Victims will continue to suffer, as judicial reckoning will be that of the conviction rather than the trauma. This might only be exacerbated because discussing it will remain exceedingly difficult. Revisiting such memories before courts is itself painful. Such memories do not allow for grieving, for finding peace. Institutional justice, including gacaca, can only offer an ersatz of justice, a truncated truth, an uncelebratory memory. It is best to acknowledge that fact.
Courts Do Not Foster Reconciliation
The possibility of reconciliation might finally arise. Only then will the ideas of forward-reaching remembrance, justice as an ideal, refusal of impunity and reconstructing social fabric coalesce. To forgive, to forget past or present punishment, is not to forget history and suffering, whether inflicted or 72 Collective pardon, enshrined in a law, does not exist. Shadows of reconciliation and caricatures of forgiveness are pardon's greatest enemiesöits very negation even. They are the lies told by politicians and the law. Amnesty, the first among such lies, continues to be a threat in Rwanda. 75 Such a decision, legislative in its explicit form, is an institutional amnesty, imposed against all truth and reconciliation. A society cannot exist while deciding that such event did not occur, but the authorities may try to force it to forget. 76 Clemency, both in a legal and institutional meaning, is the second false form of pardon, granted by the executive for its part. Political and opportunistic, it disregards victims, who have no say in its conferral or refusal.
Tribunals, regardless of their nature, do not find their place in processes of reconciliation, politics, institutions, in the law. Pardons lie at the heart of an interpersonal relationship which goes beyond the law and even morals.
77
A person who has watched his relatives being tortured and killed before him or who has suffered similar, or even lesser, acts can legitimately refuse to grant pardon. By definition, authentic pardons bear the risk of not being requested or, if they are, being refused. Pardons are never owed; any law which provides for it distorts the notion.
Gacaca courts will fulfil their mission only if they solve the wealth of legal and practical issues which have cropped up. And they will only do so if it is clear at the outset what they can or cannot accomplish. They will not achieve anything else but unsatisfactory procedures with regard to international standards of due process. They will not achieve anything else but a limited judicial truth, desperately needed by Rwandans but which cannot encompass a deeper truth, elusive and unattainable, that escapes their grasp; nothing more than partial, incomplete remembrance, which will continue to hurt victims; nothing else but a reasonable distance from vengeance, and the improbable reconstruction of an extremely fragile social fabric. The rest is beyond law and institutions. The law can only provide the circumstances for future reconciliation, which might take place, if at all, elsewhere than before gacaca courts. Rwandan authorities and the international community should accept these limitations and cease grasping at thin air.
It is still better to do justice, albeit unsatisfactorily, than not do justice at all.
